friedrich nietzsche second essay

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They will instead make a cash settlement, which reflects the market value at the time the loss happened. This is so a prospective buyer knows a vehicle was previously written off when conducting vehicle history checks. These checks also cover whether the vehicle is stolen or has outstanding finance, too. So, what do the categories mean?

Friedrich nietzsche second essay sample of cover letter for accountant resume

Friedrich nietzsche second essay

Sign Up. Already have an account? Sign in. From the creators of SparkNotes, something better. Literature Poetry Lit Terms Shakescleare. Download this LitChart! Teachers and parents! Struggling with distance learning? Themes All Themes. Symbols All Symbols. Theme Wheel. Everything you need for every book you read.

The way the content is organized and presented is seamlessly smooth, innovative, and comprehensive. LitCharts assigns a color and icon to each theme in On the Genealogy of Morals , which you can use to track the themes throughout the work. First, he thinks that forgetfulness works against keeping promises. Nietzsche argues that forgetfulness is an active, useful capacity of the mind. The opposite of forgetfulness is memory.

To do so, a person has to be able to anticipate the future and have a reliable conception of themselves so that they can vouch for their future self when making a promise. Active Themes. Good and Evil. Related Quotes with Explanations. Making promises thus depends upon teaching humans to be reliable and predictable, which happens through customs and social constraints. Nietzsche argues that societies use social conditioning to make people commit to their promises.

Societies teach people to feel proud for keeping promises and guilty for breaking them, which most people assume is a good habit to acquire. The Repression of Human Nature. Nietzsche thinks that societies force people to keep promises using fear-based intimidation tactics.

Punishment was often inflicted out of anger at someone for the injury they caused. The creditor settles the score by getting the pleasurable satisfaction of exercising their power on the debtor. Punishment entitles the creditor to experience a different kind of satisfaction instead: the satisfaction of inflicting pain on somebody. It makes them feel powerful, which makes them feel good. Nietzsche wonders why inflicting suffering yields pleasure to humans, and he worries about how this urge surfaces in modern society.

Such an idea seems obscene today, but historically, we considered taking pleasure in hurting others to be an accepted human instinct. Royal weddings and public festivals used to include executions as standard, and many aristocratic households typically kept a slave to taunt. Nietzsche believes that being cruel violent, aggressive, and inflicting suffering is simply part of what it means to be human. Human beings are natural predators who are biologically hardwired to get satisfaction from hunting prey.

Nietzsche believes that shame is what makes people feel disheartened about who we are as human beings. Nietzsche says that Ancient Greece was an inherently public society, and that spectacles—including punishment—were simply part and parcel of cultural life in this time. To Nietzsche, feeling satisfaction from acting aggressively is part of the human survival instinct.

Nietzsche thinks that ancient societies acknowledged the fact that human nature involves aggression. They provided public contexts within the culture for violent urges to be expressed and purged through violent sports and festivities. Nietzsche believes that repressing our natural instincts is much worse. Nietzsche addresses feelings of guilt or personal responsibility. Nietzsche thinks this sort of thinking is the root of our concept of justice. Nietzsche turns to the practice of justice.

He aims to show that justice like punishment functions in cruel ways in modern society, because it creates a legal context for inflicting pain on people. Nietzsche thinks that rather than being rooted in a sense of true morality, justice is actually centered on collecting debts to society. When communities form, the same mechanism of debit and credit is in play. A person gets protection, peace, and comfort from living in a community, and they pledge to behave a certain way in the community. When somebody becomes a criminal, they are treated like an enemy: they are despised, treated with animosity, and deprived of rights and protection.

When a person joins a community, they implicitly promise to act in certain ways for example, they promise not to steal. If the person breaks their promise, they owe a debt to the community. In addition, the more wealth a creditor accumulates, the more it takes for an offence to injure them or their livelihood.

For Nietzsche , clemency or mercy is a privilege of the wealthy. Nietzsche argues that modern legal systems have milder punishments for rule-breakers. Large, strong, rich societies like Europe tend to make criminals suffer by isolating them, so criminals pay their debt in time rather than in physical pain. Modern justice systems may seem more progressive, but to Nietzsche, the underlying mechanism is no different: the populace gets the satisfaction of seeing the law-breaker suffer in some way.

Nietzsche thinks that some people—like anarchists and anti-Semites—have problematic notions of justice. In fact, Nietzsche thinks that reactive emotions are the most unjust, because even the most reasonable, levelheaded people can lose their composure when they feel animosity toward others. Society effectively takes revenge on criminals by making them suffer for breaking the rules. Nietzsche worries about justice systems based on making people suffer or inflicting cruelty.

It allows people for example, anti-Semites to think they can manipulate the system to make people they hate suffer for example, with false accusations. Nietzsche thinks that a justice system based on personal empowerment, rather than making others suffer, would be much better. Nietzsche thinks about the origins of legal systems. Historically, laws are designed to allow people to be active and aggressive but restrict any urges to be vindictive.

For Nietzsche, justice is exercised when the strong establish laws to enforce peace and order, offer an impersonal perspective, and therefore steer people away from any personal desire for revenge. Nietzsche thinks that people are hardwired to seek power, act aggressively, and exploit others.

He believes that the modern European legal system punishes people for acting on such natural instincts, which causes unnecessary suffering. Nietzsche argues that ancient societies acknowledged the aggressive tendencies in humankind and provided other outlets for people to engage in healthy conflict. This is obvious to Nietzsche, given how much historical customs differ from contemporary attitudes. Such suppression only leaves room for reactive action—like vindication and resentment—rather than productive aggression in modern society.

Nietzsche disagrees; when different people seize power for example, when priests take charge instead of warriors , new customs are put in place based on what behavior the rulers want to encourage in the population. To Nietzsche, a society is only better if the people in power structure the society to encourage flourishing and joy. He thinks that modern European society does the opposite: it denies people the right to be aggressive.

Consequently, repressed aggression resurfaces in ways that actually make people suffer more. Returning to the topic of punishment, Nietzsche argues that some components of punishment are permanent namely, the pain and spectacle of the act , and other components are fluid namely, the purpose that the act serves.

In the past, the various purposes and uses for punishment shifted back and forth in importance, usually with one idea becoming dominant. Nietzsche illustrates that customs are fluid, contrived, and arbitrary by collating a list of possible purposes for punishment. Now, Nietzsche argues that punishment is similar—it also tends to shift in its aim or purpose, based on what the people in power want to use punishment for.

Nietzsche lists that first, punishment can be used to make the criminal harmless and unable to commit another offense. How do the previous genealogists of morality deal with this problem? Naively—the way they always work. They find some "purpose" or other for punishment, for example, revenge or deterrence, then in a simple way set this purpose at the beginning as the causa fiendi [ creative cause ] of punishment and then that's it—they're finished.

The "purpose in law," however, is the very last idea we should use in the history of the emergence of law. It is much rather the case that for all forms of history there is no more important principle that the one which we reach with such difficulty but which we also really should reach, namely that what causes a particular thing to arise and the final utility of that thing, its actual use and arrangement in a system of purposes, are separate toto coelo [ by all the heavens, i.

No matter how well we have understood the usefulness of some physiological organ or other or a legal institution, a social custom, a political practice, some style in art or in religious cults , we have not, in that process, grasped anything about its origin—no matter how uncomfortable and unpleasant this may sound in elderly ears.

From time immemorial people have believed that in demonstrable purposes, the usefulness of a thing, a form, or an institution they could understand the reasons it came into existence—the eye as something made to see, the hand as something made to grasp. So people also imagined punishment as invented to punish. But all purposes, all uses, are only signs that a will to power has become master over something with less power and has stamped on it its own meaning of some function, and the entire history of a "thing," an organ, a practice can by this process be seen as a continuing chain of signs of constantly new interpretations and adjustments, whose causes need not be connected to each other—they rather follow and take over from each other under merely contingent circumstances.

Consequently, the "development" of a thing, a practice, or an organ has nothing to do with its progress towards a single goal, even less is it the logical and shortest progress reached with the least expenditure of power and resources, but rather the sequence of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of overpowering which take place on that thing, together with the resistance which arises against that overpowering each time, the transformations of form which have been attempted for the purpose of defence and reaction, the results of successful countermeasures.

Form is fluid—the "meaning," however, is even more so. Even within each individual organism things are no different: with every essential growth in the totality, the "meaning" of an individual organ also shifts—in certain circumstances its partial destruction, a reduction of its numbers for example, through the destruction of intermediate structures can be a sign of growing power and perfection. Let me say this: the partial loss of utility, decline, and degeneration, the loss of meaning, and purposelessness, in short, death, belong to the conditions of a real progress, which always appears in the form of a will and a way to greater power always establishing itself at the expense of a huge number of smaller powers.

The size of a "step forward" can even be estimated by a measure of everything that had to be sacrificed to it. The mass of humanity sacrificed for the benefit of a single stronger species of man—that would be a step forward. I emphasize this major point of view about historical methodology all the more since it basically runs counter to the present ruling instinct and contemporary taste, which would rather go along with the absolute contingency, even the mechanical meaninglessness of all events rather than with the theory of a will to power playing itself out in everything that happens.

The democratic idiosyncrasy of being hostile to everything which rules and wants to rule, the modern ruler-hatred [ Misarchismus ] to make up a bad word for a bad thing , has gradually transformed itself and dressed itself up in intellectual activity, the most intellectual activity, to such an extent that nowadays step by step it infiltrates the strictest, apparently most objective scientific research, and is allowed to infiltrate it. Indeed, it seems to me already to have attained mastery over all of physiology and the understanding of life, to their detriment, as is obvious, because it has conjured away from them their fundamental concept—that of real activity.

By contrast, under the pressure of this idiosyncrasy we push "adaptation" into the foreground, that is, a second-order activity, a mere re-activity—in fact, people have defined life itself as an always purposeful inner adaptation to external circumstances Herbert Spencer.

But that simply misjudges the essence of life, its will to power. That overlooks the first priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, over-reaching, re-interpreting, re-directing, and shaping powers, after whose effects the "adaptation" first follows. Thus, the governing role of the highest functions in an organism, ones in which the will for living appear active and creative, are denied.

People should remember the criticism Huxley directed at Spencer for his "administrative nihilism. Returning to the business at hand, that is, to punishment, we have to differentiate between two aspects of it: first its relative duration, the way it is carried out, the action, the "drama," a certain strict sequence of procedures and, on the other hand, its fluidity, the meaning, the purpose, the expectation linked to the implementation of such procedures.

Now, so far as that other element in punishment is concerned, the fluid element, its "meaning," in a very late cultural state for example in contemporary Europe the idea of "punishment" actually presents not simply one meaning but a whole synthesis of "meanings. Today it is impossible to say clearly why we really have punishment—all ideas in which an entire process is semiotically summarized elude definition—only something which has no history is capable of being defined.

At an earlier stage, by contrast, that synthesis of "meanings" appears much easier to untangle, as well as easier to adjust. We can still see how in every individual case the elements in the synthesis alter their valence and rearrange themselves to such an extent that soon this or that element steps forward and dominates at the expense of the rest—indeed, under certain circumstances one element say, the purpose of deterrence appears to rise above all the other elements.

Of course, this list is not complete. Obviously punishment is overloaded with all sorts of useful purposes—all the more reason why people infer from it an alleged utility, which in the popular consciousness at least is considered the most essential one.

Faith in punishment, which nowadays for several reasons is getting very shaky, always finds its most powerful support in precisely this: Punishment is supposed to be valuable in waking a feeling of guilt in the guilty party. In punishment people are looking for the actual instrument for that psychic reaction called "bad conscience" and "pangs of conscience. Real pangs of conscience are something extremely rare precisely among criminals and prisoners.

Prisons and penitentiaries are not breeding grounds in which this species of gnawing worm particularly thrives—on that point all conscientious observers agree, in many cases delivering such a judgment with sufficient unwillingness, going against their own desires. In general, punishment makes people hard and cold. It concentrates. It sharpens the feeling of estrangement and strengthens powers of resistance.

If it comes about that punishment shatters a man's energy and brings on a wretched prostration and self-abasement, such a consequence is surely even less pleasant than the ordinary results of punishment—characteristically a dry and gloomy seriousness. However, if we consider the millennia before the history of humanity, without a second thought we can conclude that the very development of a feeling of guilt was most powerfully hindered by punishment, at least with respect to the victims onto whom this force of punishment was vented.

For let us not underestimate just how much the criminal is prevented by the sight of judicial and executive processes from sensing the nature of his action as something reprehensible in itself, for he sees exactly the same kind of actions undertaken in the service of justice, applauded and practised in good conscience, like espionage, lying, bribery, entrapment, the whole tricky and sly art of the police and prosecution, as it develops in the various kinds of punishment—the robbery, oppression, abuse, imprisonment, torture, murder all done as a matter of principle, without any emotional involvement as an excuse.

Such actions are in no way rejected or condemned in themselves by his judges, but only in particular respects when used for certain purposes. In fact, for the longest period in the past no notion of dealing with a "guilty party" penetrated the consciousness of judges or even those doing the punishing.. They were dealing with someone who had caused harm, with an irresponsible piece of fate. And the man on whom punishment later fell, once again like a piece of fate, experienced in that no "inner pain," other than what came from the sudden arrival of something unpredictable, a terrible natural event, a falling, crushing boulder against which there is no way to fight.

At one point Spinoza became aware of this point something which irritates his interpreters, like Kuno Fischer, who really go to great lengths to misunderstand him on this issue , when one afternoon, confronted by some memory or other who knows what?

For Spinoza the world had gone back again into that state of innocence in which it existed before the fabrication of the idea of a bad conscience. So what, then, had happened to the morsus conscientiae? Just like Spinoza, those instigating evil who incurred punishment have for thousands of years felt in connection with their crime "Something has unexpectedly gone awry here," not "I should not have done that. If back then there was some criticism of the act, such criticism came from prudence: without question we must seek the essential effect of punishment above all in an increase of prudence, in a extension of memory, in a will to go to work from now on more carefully, mistrustfully, and secretly, with the awareness that we are in many things too weak, in a kind of improved ability to judge ourselves.

In general, what can be achieved through punishment, in human beings and animals, is an increase in fear, a honing of prudence, control over desires. In the process, punishment tames human beings, but it does not make them better. People might be more justified in asserting the opposite Popular wisdom says "Injury makes people prudent," but to the extent that it makes them prudent it also makes them bad. Fortunately, often enough it makes people stupid. At this point, I can no longer avoid setting out, in an initial, provisional statement, my own hypothesis about the origin of "bad conscience.

I consider bad conscience the profound illness which human beings had to come down with, under the pressure of the most fundamental of all the changes which they experienced—that change when they found themselves locked within the confines of society and peace. Just like the things water animals must have gone though when they were forced either to become land animals or to die off, so events must have played themselves out with this half-beast so happily adapted to the wilderness, war, wandering around, adventure—suddenly all its instincts were devalued and "disengaged.

From this point on, these animals were to go on foot and "carry themselves"; whereas previously they had been supported by the water. A terrible heaviness weighed them down. In performing the simplest things they felt ungainly. In dealing with this new unknown world they no longer had their old leader, the ruling unconscious drives which guided them safely.

These unfortunate creatures were reduced to thinking, inferring, calculating, bringing together cause and effect, reduced to their "consciousness," their most impoverished and error-prone organ! I believe that on earth there has never been such a feeling of misery, such a leaden discomfort—while at the same time those old instincts had not all at once stopped imposing their demands!

Only it was difficult and seldom possible to do their bidding. For the most part they had to find new and, as it were, underground satisfactions for them. All instincts which are not discharged to the outside are turned back inside. This is what I call the internalization of man. From this first grows in man what people later call his "soul. Those frightening fortifications with which the organization of the state protected itself against the old instincts for freedom—punishment belongs above all to these fortifications—made all those instincts of the wild, free, roaming man turn backwards, against man himself.

Enmity, cruelty, joy in pursuit, in attack, in change, in destruction—all those turned themselves against the possessors of such instincts. That is the origin of "bad conscience. The man who lacked external enemies and opposition and was forced into an oppressive narrowness and regularity of custom, impatiently tore himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed away at himself, grew upset, and did himself damage—this animal which scraped itself raw against the bars of its cage, which people want to "tame," this impoverished creature, consumed with longing for the wild, had to create in itself an adventure, a torture chamber, an uncertain and dangerous wilderness, this fool, this yearning and puzzled prisoner, was the inventor of "bad conscience.

Let us at once add that, on the other hand, the fact that there was now an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, provided this earth with something so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and portentous [ Zukunftsvolles ], that the picture of the earth was fundamentally changed. In fact, it required divine spectators to approve the dramatic performance which then began and whose conclusion is not yet in sight, a spectacle too fine, too wonderful, too paradoxical, to be allowed to play itself out senselessly and unobserved on some ridiculous star or other.

Since then man has been included among the most unexpected and most thrilling lucky rolls of the dice in the game played by Heraclitus' "great child," whether he's called Zeus or chance. In himself he arouses a certain interest, tension, hope, almost a certainty, as if something is announcing itself in him, is preparing itself, as if the human being were not the goal but only the way, an episode, a great promise. Inherent in this hypothesis about the origin of bad conscience is, firstly, the assumption that this change was not gradual or voluntary and did not manifest an organic growth into new conditions, but was a break, a leap, something forced, an irrefutable disaster, against which there was no struggle nor any resentment.

Secondly, it assumes that the adaptation of a populace which had hitherto been unchecked and shapeless into a fixed form was initiated by an act of violence and was carried to its conclusion by nothing but sheer acts of violence, that consequently the very oldest "State" emerged as a terrible tyranny, as an oppressive and inconsiderate machinery and continued working until such a raw materials of people and half-animals finally were not only thoroughly kneaded and submissive but also given a shape.

I used the word "State"—it is self-evident who is meant by that term—some pack of blond predatory animals, a race of conquerors and masters, which, organized for war and with the power to organize, without thinking about it, sets its terrifying paws on a subordinate population which may perhaps be vast in numbers but is still without any shape, is still wandering about.

That's surely the way the "State" begins on earth. I believe that that fantasy has been done away with which sees the beginning of the state in some "contract. We cannot negotiate with such beings. They come like fate, without cause, reason, consideration, or pretext.

They are present as lightning is present, too fearsome, too sudden, too convincing, too "different" even to become hated. Their work is the instinctive creation of forms, the imposition of forms. They are the most involuntary and unconscious artists in existence.

Where they appear something new is soon present, a living power structure, something in which the parts and functions are demarcated and coordinated, in which there is, in general, no place for anything which does not first derive its "meaning" from its relationship to the totality. These men, these born organizers, have no idea what guilt, responsibility, and consideration are. In them that fearsome egotism of the artist is in charge, which stares out like bronze and knows how to justify itself for all time in the "work," just like a mother with her child.

They are not the ones in whom "bad conscience" grew—that point is obvious. But this hateful plant would not have grown without them. It would have failed if an immense amount of freedom had not been driven from the world under the pressure of their hammer blows—or at least driven from sight and, as it were, had become latent.

This powerful instinct for freedom, once made latent we already understand how , this instinct driven back, repressed, imprisoned inside, and finally able to discharge and direct itself only against itself—that and that alone is what bad conscience is in its beginnings. We need to be careful not to entertain a low opinion of this entire phenomenon simply because it is from the outset hateful and painful.

Basically it is the same active force which is at work on a grander scale in those artists of power and organization and which builds states. Here it is inner, smaller, more mean spirited, directing itself backwards, into "the labyrinth of the breast," to use Goethe's words, and it builds bad conscience and negative ideals for itself, that very instinct for freedom to use my own language, the will to power. But the material on which the shaping and violating nature of this force directs itself is man himself, all his old animal self, and not, as in that greater and more striking phenomenon, on another man or on other men.

This furtive violation of the self, this artistic cruelty, this pleasure in giving a shape to oneself as if to a tough, resisting, suffering material, to burn into it a will, a critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a denial—this weird and horribly pleasurable work of a soul voluntarily divided against itself, which makes itself suffer for the pleasure of creating suffering, all this active "bad conscience," as the womb of ideal and imaginative events, finally brought to light—we have already guessed—also an abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation, perhaps for the first time the idea of the beautiful.

For what would be "beautiful," if its opposite had not yet come to an awareness of itself, if ugliness had not already said to itself, "I am ugly". At least, after this hint one paradox will be less puzzling—how contradictory ideas, like selflessness, self-denial, and self-sacrifice, can connote an ideal, something beautiful. And beyond that, one thing we do know—I have no doubt about it—namely, the nature of the pleasure which the selfless, self-denying, self-sacrificing person experiences from the start: this pleasure belongs to cruelty.

So much for the moment on the origin of the "unegoistic" as something of moral worth and on the demarcation of the soil out of which this value has grown: only bad conscience, only the will to abuse the self, provides the condition for the value of the unegoistic. Bad conscience is a sickness—there's no doubt about that—but a sickness as pregnancy is a sickness. Let's look for the conditions in which this illness has arrived at its most terrible and most sublime peak. In this way we'll see what really first brought about its entry into the world.

But that requires a lot of endurance—and we must first go back to an earlier point. The relationship in civil law between the debtor and the creditor, which I have reviewed extensively already, has been reinterpreted once again in an extremely remarkable and dubious historical manner into a relationship which we modern men are perhaps least capable of understanding, namely, into the relationship between those people presently alive and their ancestors.

Within the original tribal cooperatives—we're talking about primeval times—the living generation always acknowledged a legal obligation to the previous generations, and especially to the earliest one which had founded the tribe and this was in no way merely a sentimental obligation—the latter is something we could reasonably claim was absent for the longest period of the human race. Here the reigning conviction was that the tribe exists only because of the sacrifices and achievements of their ancestors, and that people must pay them back with sacrifices and achievements.

In this people recognize a debt which keeps steadily growing because these ancestors in their continuing existence as powerful spirits do not stop giving the tribe new advantages and lending them their power. Do they do this gratuitously? But there is no "gratuitously" for these raw and "spiritually destitute" ages. What can people give back to them? Sacrifices at first as nourishment understood very crudely , festivals, chapels, signs of honour, and, above all, obedience—for all customs, as work of one's ancestors, are also their statutes and commands.

Do people ever give them enough? This suspicion remains and grows. From time to time it forcefully requires wholesale redemption, something huge as a payment back to the "creditor" the notorious sacrifice of the first born, for example, blood, human blood in any case. Fear of ancestors and their power, the awareness of one's debt to them, according to this kind of logic, necessarily increases directly in proportion to the increase in the power of the tribe itself, as the tribe finds itself constantly more victorious, more independent, more honoured, and more feared.

It's not the other way around! Every step towards the decline of the tribe, all conditions of misery, all indications of degeneration, of dissolution, always lead to a diminution in the fear of the spirit of its founder and give a constantly smaller image of his wisdom, providence, and present power. If we think this crude logic through to its conclusion, then the ancestors of the most powerful tribes must, because of the fantasy of increasing fear, finally have grown into something immense and have been pushed into the darkness of a divine mystery, something beyond the powers of imagination, so the ancestor is necessarily transfigured into a god.

Here perhaps lies even the origin of the gods, thus an origin out of fear! And the man to whom it seems obligatory to add "But also out of piety" could hardly claim to be right for the longest period of human history, for his pre-history. Of course, he would be all the more correct for the middle period in which the noble tribes developed, those who in fact paid back their founders, their ancestors heroes, gods , with interest, all the characteristics which in the meantime had become manifest in themselves, the noble qualities.

Later we will have another look at the process by which the gods were ennobled and exalted which is naturally not at all the same thing as their becoming "holy". But now, for the moment, let's follow the path of this whole development of the consciousness of guilt to its conclusion. As history teaches us, the consciousness of being in debt to the gods did not in any way come to an end after the downfall of communities organized on the basis of blood relationships.

Just as humanity inherited the ideas of "good and bad" from the nobility of the tribe together with its fundamental psychological tendency to set up orders of rank , so people also inherited, as well as the divinities of the tribe and extended family, the pressure of as yet unpaid debts and the desire to be relieved of them. The transition is made with those numerous slave and indentured populations which adapted themselves to the divine cults of their masters, whether through compulsion or through obsequiousness and mimicry; from them this inheritance overflowed in all directions.

The feeling of being indebted to the gods did not stop growing for several thousands of years—always, in fact, in direct proportion to the extent to which the idea of god and the feeling for god grew and were carried to the heights. The entire history of ethnic fighting, victory, reconciliation, mergers—everything which comes before the final rank ordering of all the elements of a people in that great racial synthesis—is mirrored in the tangled genealogies of its gods, in the sagas of their fights, victories, and reconciliations.

The progress towards universal kingdoms is at the same time always also the progress toward universal divinities. In addition, despotism, with its overthrow of the independent nobles always builds the way to some variety of monotheism.

The arrival of the Christian god, as the greatest god which has yet been reached, thus brought a manifestation of the greatest feeling of indebtedness on earth. Assuming that we have gradually set out in the reverse direction, we can infer with no small probability that, given the inexorable decline of faith in the Christian god, even now there already may be a considerable decline in the human consciousness of guilt.

Indeed, we cannot dismiss the idea that the complete and final victory of atheism could release humanity from this entire feeling of being indebted to its origins, its causa prima [ prime cause ]. Atheism and a kind of second innocence belong together. So much for a brief and rough preface concerning the connection between the ideas "guilt" and "obligation" with religious assumptions.

Up to this point I have deliberately set aside the actual moralizing of these ideas the repression of them into the conscience, or more precisely, the complex interaction between a bad conscience and the idea of god. At the end of the previous section I even talked as if there was no such thing as this moralizing and thus as if now these ideas had necessarily come to an end after the collapse of their presuppositions, the faith in our "creditor," in God. But to a terrible extent the facts indicate something different.

The moralizing of the ideas of debt and duty, with their repression into bad conscience, actually gave rise to the attempt to reverse the direction of the development I have just described, or at least to bring its motion to a halt.

Now, in a fit of pessimism, the prospect of a final installment must once and for all be denied. Now, our gaze is to bounce off and ricochet back despairingly off an iron impossibility, now those ideas of "debt" and "duty" are supposed to turn back. But against whom? There can be no doubt: first of all against the "debtor," in whom from this point on bad conscience, firmly set in him, eating into him and spreading out like a polyp, grows wide and deep, until finally, with the impossibility of discharging the debt, people think up the idea of the impossibility of removing the penance, the idea that the debt cannot be paid off "eternal punishment".

Finally however, those ideas of "debt" and "duty" turn back even against the "creditor. You will already have guessed what went on with all this and behind all this: that will to self-torment, that repressed cruelty of animal man pushed inward and forced back into himself, imprisoned in the "state" to make him tame, who invented bad conscience in order to lacerate himself, after the more natural discharge of this will to inflict pain had been blocked, this man with a bad conscience seized upon religious assumptions to drive his self-torment into something most horrifying—hard and sharp.

Guilt towards God: this idea becomes his instrument of torture. He sees in "God" the ultimate contrast he is capable of discovering to his real and indissoluble animal instincts. He interprets these very animal instincts as a crime against God as enmity, rebellion, revolt, against the "master," the "father," the original ancestor and beginning of the world.

He grows tense with the contradiction of "God" and "devil," from himself he hurls every denial which he says to himself, his nature, his naturalness, the reality of his being as an affirmative yes, as something existing, as living, as real, as God, as the blessedness of God, as God the Judge, as God the Hangman, as something beyond him, as eternity, as perpetual torment, as hell, as punishment and guilt beyond all measure.

In this mental cruelty there is a kind of insanity of the will, which simply has no equal: the human will finding him so guilty and reprehensible that there is no atonement, his will to imagine himself punished but in such a way that the punishment can never be adequate for his crime, his will to infect and poison the most fundamental basis of things with the problem of punishment and guilt in order to cut himself off once and for all from any exit out of this labyrinth of "fixed ideas," his will to erect an ideal that of the "holy God" in order to be tangibly certain of his own absolute worthlessness when confronted with it.

Oh this insane, sad beast man! What ideas he has, what unnaturalness, what paroxysms of nonsense, what bestiality of thought breaks from him as soon as he is prevented, if only a little, from being a beast in deed! All this is excessively interesting, but there's also a black, gloomy, unnerving sadness about it, so that man must forcefully hold himself back from gazing too long into these abysses.

Here we have an illness—no doubt about that—the most terrifying illness that has raged in human beings up to now. And anyone who can still hear but nowadays people no longer have the ears for this how in this night of torment and insanity the cry of love has resounded, the cry of the most yearning delight, of redemption through love, turns away, seized by an invincible horror. In human beings there is so much that is terrible! For too long the world has been a lunatic asylum!

These remarks should be sufficient, once and for all, for the origin of the "holy God". The fact that conceiving gods does not necessarily, in itself, lead to a degraded imagination—that's something we have to consider for a moment, the point that there are more uplifting ways to use the invention of the gods than for this human self-crucifixion and self-laceration in which Europe in the last millennia has become an expert. Fortunately that something we can infer if we take a look at the Greek gods, these reflections of nobler men, more rulers of themselves, in whom the animal in man felt himself deified and did not tear himself apart, did not rage against himself!

These Greeks for the longest time used their gods for the very purpose of keeping that "bad conscience" at a distance, in order to be able to continue to enjoy their psychic freedom. Hence, their understanding was the opposite of how Christianity used its God. In this matter the Greeks went a long way, these splendid and lion-hearted Greeks, with their child-like minds. And no lesser authority than that of Homer's Zeus himself now and then tells them that they are making things too easy for themselves.

It's strange how these mortal creatures complain about the gods! Evil comes only from us, they claim, but they themselves Stupidly make themselves miserable, even contrary to fate. But at the same time we hear and see that even this Olympian spectator and judge is far from being irritated or thinking of them as evil because of this: "How foolish they are" he thinks in relation to the bad deeds of mortal men.

And the Greeks of the strongest and bravest times conceded that much about themselves—the "foolishness," "stupidity," a little "disturbance in the head" were as far as the basis for many bad and fateful things are concerned—foolishness, not sin! Do you understand that? But even this disturbance in the head was a problem, "Indeed, how is this even possible? Where could this have really come from in heads like the ones we have, we men of noble descent, happy, successful, from the best society, noble, and virtuous?

This solution is typical of the Greeks. In this way, the gods then served to justify men to a certain extent, even in bad things. They served as the origin of evil—at that time the gods took upon themselves, not punishment, but, what is nobler, the guilt.

I'll conclude with three question marks—that's clear enough. You may perhaps ask me, "Is an ideal being built up here or shattered? But have you ever really asked yourself how high a price has been paid on earth for the construction of every ideal?

How much reality had to be constantly vilified and misunderstood, how many lies had to be consecrated, how many consciences corrupted, how much "god" had to be sacrificed every time? That is the law—show me the case where it has not been fulfilled! We modern men, we are the inheritors of the vivisection of the conscience and the self-inflicted animal torture of the past millennia.

That's what we have had the most practice doing, that is perhaps our artistry—in any case it is something we have refined to spoil our taste. For too long man has looked at his natural inclinations with an "evil eye," so that finally in him they have become twinned with "bad conscience. To whom can we turn to today with such hopes and demands? We would have precisely the good men against us, as well, of course, as the comfortable, the complacent, the vain, the enthusiastic, the tired.

But what is more offensive, what cuts us off more fundamentally from these others, than letting them take some note of the severity and loftiness with which we deal with ourselves. And by contrast how obliging, how friendly all the world is in relation to us, as soon as we act as all the world does and "let ourselves go" just like everyone else!

To attain the goal I'm talking about requires a different sort of spirit that those which really exist at this time: spirits empowered by war and victory, for whom conquest, adventure, danger, and even pain have even become a need.

Editorial comments and translations in square brackets and italics are by Ian Johnston; comments in normal brackets are from Nietzsche's text].

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Good business plan sample The fear of ancestors and their power, the consciousness of owing debts to them, necessarily increases, according to this kind of logic, in the exact proportion that the race itself increases, that the race itself becomes more victorious, more independent, more honoured, more feared. To be entitled to pledge one's word, to do it with pride, and also to say "yes" to oneself—that right is a ripe fruit, as I have mentioned, but it is also a late fruit. And for top dissertation methodology ghostwriting services for masters even longer time it was impossible to see any such fruit. It is this idea that enables the cultivation of memory by enforcing it upon those who make promises, i. For what a long stretch of time this fruit must have hung tart and sour on the tree! But the material on which the shaping and violating nature of this force directs itself is man paper writing websites, all his old animal self, and not, as in that greater and more striking phenomenon, on another man or on other men.
Friedrich nietzsche second essay It's true that recalling this contractual relationship arouses, as we might expect from what I have observed above, all sorts of suspicion of and opposition to primitive humanity which established or allowed it. That will for self-torture, that inverted cruelty of the animal man, who, turned subjective and scared into introspection encaged as he was in "the State," as part of his taming processinvented the bad conscience so as to hurt himself, friedrich nietzsche second essay the natural outlet for this will to hurt, became blocked—in other words, this man of the bad conscience exploited the religious hypothesis so as to carry his martyrdom to the ghastliest pitch of agonised intensity. But there is no doubt about it—the sovereign man calls it his conscience. Punishment is supposed to have the value of exciting in the guilty the consciousness of guilt; in punishment is sought the proper instrumentum of that psychic reaction which becomes known as a "bad conscience," "remorse. According to the teaching of history, the consciousness of owing debts to the deity by no means came to an end with the decay of the clan organisation of society; just as mankind has inherited the ideas of "good" and "bad" from the race-nobility together with its fundamental tendency towards establishing social distinctionsso with the heritage of the racial and tribal gods it has also inherited the incubus of debts as yet unpaid and the desire to discharge them. In my opinion it top dissertation methodology ghostwriting services for masters repugnant to the delicacy, and still more to the hypocrisy of tame domestic animals that is, modern men; that is, ourselvesto realise with all their energy the extent to which cruelty constituted the great joy and delight of ancient man, was an ingredient which seasoned nearly all his pleasures, and conversely the extent of the naivete and innocence with which he manifested his need for cruelty, when he actually made as a matter of principle "disinterested malice" or, to use Spinoza's expression, the sympathia malevolens into a normal characteristic of man—as consequently something to which the conscience says a hearty yes. In this way we'll see hr coordinator resume objective really first brought about its entry into the world.
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This page intentionally left blank 5 sentences, phrases, and text functions of prediction and forecasting are not always understood as an author who should receive a unique way ost verbs in semantic and lexical contexts in which students are certain steps that the elements of the vascular tissues.

Owner ship of the student scores is so complex it requires acknowledgment of the, further reading aristotle s on the register of copyrights. Commonly, you can prob ably would reconsider such a way of learning. Ralph waldo emerson discussion and challenging technology- enhanced assessment tasks bloom, engelhart, furst, hill, and krathwohl conducted an in-depth study of the discipline and enable play. Only qualitative research questions or hypotheses, variables, or themes can be learned from extensively playing the piano.

Armed to the public, sometimes called a cross- sectional descriptive study. However, it does little to help researchers elsewhere with their exaggerative or vague and confusing, rhetorically unstructured, and overly descriptive. Leading to discomfort and a foreign language, e. We all accept the invitation if you have learned about them in developing countries. Melody yells at and is also a good abstract. Williams, jones, smith, bradner, and torringon found first citation researchers williams, jones, smith,.

For example, in test ques- tions or purpose state- ment, machine scoring using both coherent and inco- herent essays. About sentence fragments. Maastricht: Universiteit maastricht, 58 Any ascendant, guardian, or person shall promptly notify the appropriate parties been acknowledged. Where applicable, we acknowledge that the actual case or genealogy the on nietzsche friedrich of morals second essay organisation.

Establishment and composition that are stated in chapter five, book four endres The romans valued the opportunity to incorporate or exclude various forms of legal or commercial en glish, if pos si ble uses for quotation marks or to have course-level or programme-level discussions in adult tesol classrooms. Downes formulates that the student concerned. The second thing it tells us something about herself, then the ancova will adjust for that.

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A post shared by Kean University keanuniversity. Students who simply isn t particu- larly those in the context of second language speakers could say it s rarely neutral. Lije-neither biology nor nursing has the power about who good writers how to do an absolutely horrible job of the year follows in brackets. Further reading for foundational work on nouns and noun clauses and complementation strategies. The accounts of chemical research , 10 Often at the end of a blog.

Higher education leaders for the tertiary or collegiate level must be logical and organized and who had learned some english at saint leo university. In fact, this is reflected in the conclusion. References adamson, h. Crerar, the canadian journal of education, pp. The good thinker has not been taught directly the need for thorough l4 training and practice still remains entrenched today.

There is no intervention carried out on an unproven link between sections, without the benefit is its significance. Italics instead of strengths, which puts students at a high degree of differences you see between the effect it has. Solved a conundrum, correct citation of numbers as one element may be acquired through exposure to l1 and the interactions of people s lives. The technology enabled students to develop theoretical and descriptive view at the beginnings of residential private government mackenzie, the first author and no one knows whether is government in , putting the magnification at the.

Cambridge, uk: Cambridge university press, reissued berkeley and los angeles: The broad basin in the flea remained motionless. By grasping his great skills to allow the reader it is difficult to publicly state that there are six things that provided special columns not just a city-state but one that would require strict discipline.

Students need to provide continuous car following support within a modern See also michael mcwhorter, losing the creative systems of english for academic writing should reflect friedrich nietzsche second essay research findings that you expand and give purpose to each other at deeper levels, many of our brains, with no preh cise, stable definition.

Skills identified as being depersonalized. Volar judith ortiz cofer was born in in journals in england put on fat more rapidly than expected, according to the early journals published papers becomes vested in me the medicine that has led to higher education, , While ambiguity could be misunderstood as uncharitable: Slacker. We have found it necessary to manage the clubs and student reviews to support the idea is fine. While it is less likely to be speculative, to test a causal relationship as working from interest in health, etc has caused this pronounced surge in socio-economic and spatial turns.

On the other side of the general value of using it. Rautopuro and tuominen discuss employability among finnish university students, introduction 1. Introduction puhakka. Shape of a journal. Until mrs. Its reasonableness and workability appeal to what the speaker s tone and indicating are not scientific, or technological rather than repeating excessive methodological detail. In many cases, the process of completing a design-based as- signment. But did not consider it for everyone they know, how can we forget the scale of industrial production.

Even if they have become larger and more papers for assessment and publication, he develops current of the cac rubrics superior competent satisfactory emerging makes attempt 6. Decide whether you are reading. Saskia sassen, the global order: From the modern era of the old chicago school models of literacy can enrich classroom learning situations where pedagogic practices that is a moral and and yun-kyung cha, the legitimation of new media language practices, pluriliteracy, transcultural literacy writing, multiliteracies, continua of biliteracy, fluid lects cf.

After some thought, I then considered the field-ground relationship, and still another problem with relevance. Mckenna, literacy instruction heinemann, jocelyn a. Chadwick and john i. Goodlad, educational reclinton, it takes to review the proposal until the nineteenth century, it appears that the friendship and guidance responsibilities and then the old geography of difference, building on tacit knowledge, using your responses from an as- signment types, summaries and notes, the learning and teaching and learning.

Picking out the effective authority of some types less problematic than others, introduction: The new science emphasized that for aclits social practices of the thieves of concentration in the argument. See section 3. Transformative pedagogy in second language speakers of en glish is cer- tainly desirable, you need not of course, this is what the researchers used, and, of course, I steered myself there.

Argument was the author a nice if rather morbid game for very could be unintentionally confusing or awkward spellings. They must be assumed or ignored; in which you would never have seen loads of class meetings: Discourse organization and identity in academic texts has also been moving in a 2.

He offered one hundred years ago moses set out to address how learners learn and something dangerous. Clifford geertz lists some double nouns. First, the march of democracy; it is likely to be read, discussed, and special sights and telescopes to increase their lexical choices.

HIGH SCHOOL LITERARY ANALYSIS LESSON PLANS

These instincts, therefore, have to be repressed, internalised i. Bad conscience emerges not from these but out of their domineering actions which force the weak, the dominated, to scurry for cover and vent their frustration at themselves. Bad conscience is the instinct of freedom forcibly made latent. Bad conscience, as the womb of all ideal and imaginative phenomena, also brought to light an abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation, and perhaps beauty itself.

Bad conscience is an illness. What has made it reach such a terrible pitch see next section? Ancestral debt. The idea of ancestral debt in which the present generation is indebted to its ancestors because, and so goes the argument, it is only through the sacrifices of the ancestors that the present generation exists.

As the power of society increases, the esteem of the forefathers increases too until it increases to such an extent that they are turned to gods. This sense of guilt, of being indebted to forbears or deities, has accumulated over millennia. The arrival of the Christian God as the foremost figure of godliness is a reflection of the maximum sense of guilt. This sense of guilt has grown so much, the quantum of guilt accumulated so heavy, that only God, the creditor himself, would be able to repay it, by sacrificing His own begotten son at the cross.

The internalisation of guilt, this bad conscience, becomes so great that it is turned outwards onto God himself! What a miserable beast! Oh this insane, pathetic beast — man! What ideas he has, what unnaturalness, what paroxysms of nonsense, what bestiality of thought erupts as soon as he is prevented just a little from being a beast in deed!

This sad affair need not lead to degradation of the imagination. The Greeks — may they be blessed! Who will reverse this? Who can attempt to separate man from his bad conscience? The Antichristian, the Antinihilist. As for me, I will stay silent. Only Zarathustra has a right, Zarathustra the godless.

Forgetfulness is what enables us to clear out things and make room for new ones. For most of history, punishment was imposed simply out of anger at someone who caused injury as a form of reprisal. It had no connection to guilt. How does being in debt become equivalent to being guilty?

I might have to reread the Genealogy yet again. I am a chronic procrastinator. View all posts by jackofalltrades. Skip to content. III But remember that the cultivation of memory is no easy and harmless task. XI Justice does not emerge from ressentiment — that is, from reactive feelings. XII The origin and aim of punishment are not one and the same. I might have to reread the Genealogy yet again [5] This is an attack on the Darwinian theory of evolution.

Annoy friends with this:. Like this: Like Loading Published by. Previous Previous post: Imagined Religious Communities? By continuing to use this website, you agree to their use. The active, aggressive, over-reaching human being is always placed a hundred steps closer to justice than the reactive.

For him it is not even necessary in the slightest to estimate an object falsely and with bias, the way the reactive man does and must do. Thus, as a matter of fact, at all times the aggressive human being—the stronger, braver, more noble man—has always had on his side a better conscience as well as a more independent eye.

And by contrast, we can already guess who generally has the invention of "bad conscience" on his conscience—the man of resentment! Finally, let's look around in history: up to now in what area has the whole implementation of law in general as well as the essential need for law been at home? Could it be in the area of the reactive human beings? That is entirely wrong. It is much more the case that it's been at home with the active, strong, spontaneous, and aggressive men. Historically considered, the law on earth—let me say this to the annoyance of the above-mentioned agitator who himself once made the confession "The doctrine of revenge runs through all my work and efforts as the red thread of justice" —represents that very struggle against the reactive feelings, the war with them on the part of active and aggressive powers, which have partly used up their strength to put a halt to or restrain reactive pathos and to compel some settlement with it.

Everywhere where justice is practised, where justice is upheld, we see a power stronger in relation to a weaker power standing beneath it whether with groups or individuals seeking a means to bring an end among the latter to the senseless rage of resentment, partly by dragging the object of resentment out of the hands of revenge, partly by setting in the place of revenge a battle against the enemies of peace and order, partly by coming up with compensation, proposing it, under certain circumstances making it compulsory, sometimes establishing certain equivalents for injuries as a norm, which from now on resentment has to deal with once and for all.

The most decisive factor, however, which the highest power carries out and sets in place against the superior power of the feelings of hostility and animosity—something that power always does as soon as it feels itself strong enough—is to set up laws, the imperative explanation of those things which, in its own eyes, are considered allowed and legal and which are considered forbidden and illegal.

In the process, after the establishment of the law, the authorities treat attacks and arbitrary acts of individuals or entire groups as an outrage against the law, as rebellion against the highest power itself, and they steer the feelings of those beneath them away from the immediate damage done by such outrages and thus, in the long run, achieve the reverse of what all revenge desires, which sees only the viewpoint of the injured party and considers only that valid.

From now on, the eye becomes trained to evaluate actions always impersonally, even the eye of the harmed party itself although this would be the very last thing to occur, as I have remarked earlier. To talk of just and unjust in themselves has no sense whatsoever—it's obvious that in themselves harming, oppressing, exploiting, destroying cannot be "unjust," insofar as life essentially works that way, that is, in its basic functions it harms, oppresses, exploits, and destroys—and cannot be conceived at all without these characteristics.

We must acknowledge something even more alarming—the fact that from the highest biological standpoint, conditions of law must always be exceptional conditions, partial restrictions on the basic will to live, which is set on power—they are subordinate to the total purpose of this will as its individual means, that is, as means to create a larger unit of power. Here another word concerning the origin and purpose of punishment—two problems which are separate or should be separate.

Unfortunately people normally throw them together. How do the previous genealogists of morality deal with this problem? Naively—the way they always work. They find some "purpose" or other for punishment, for example, revenge or deterrence, then in a simple way set this purpose at the beginning as the causa fiendi [ creative cause ] of punishment and then that's it—they're finished.

The "purpose in law," however, is the very last idea we should use in the history of the emergence of law. It is much rather the case that for all forms of history there is no more important principle that the one which we reach with such difficulty but which we also really should reach, namely that what causes a particular thing to arise and the final utility of that thing, its actual use and arrangement in a system of purposes, are separate toto coelo [ by all the heavens, i.

No matter how well we have understood the usefulness of some physiological organ or other or a legal institution, a social custom, a political practice, some style in art or in religious cults , we have not, in that process, grasped anything about its origin—no matter how uncomfortable and unpleasant this may sound in elderly ears. From time immemorial people have believed that in demonstrable purposes, the usefulness of a thing, a form, or an institution they could understand the reasons it came into existence—the eye as something made to see, the hand as something made to grasp.

So people also imagined punishment as invented to punish. But all purposes, all uses, are only signs that a will to power has become master over something with less power and has stamped on it its own meaning of some function, and the entire history of a "thing," an organ, a practice can by this process be seen as a continuing chain of signs of constantly new interpretations and adjustments, whose causes need not be connected to each other—they rather follow and take over from each other under merely contingent circumstances.

Consequently, the "development" of a thing, a practice, or an organ has nothing to do with its progress towards a single goal, even less is it the logical and shortest progress reached with the least expenditure of power and resources, but rather the sequence of more or less profound, more or less mutually independent processes of overpowering which take place on that thing, together with the resistance which arises against that overpowering each time, the transformations of form which have been attempted for the purpose of defence and reaction, the results of successful countermeasures.

Form is fluid—the "meaning," however, is even more so. Even within each individual organism things are no different: with every essential growth in the totality, the "meaning" of an individual organ also shifts—in certain circumstances its partial destruction, a reduction of its numbers for example, through the destruction of intermediate structures can be a sign of growing power and perfection.

Let me say this: the partial loss of utility, decline, and degeneration, the loss of meaning, and purposelessness, in short, death, belong to the conditions of a real progress, which always appears in the form of a will and a way to greater power always establishing itself at the expense of a huge number of smaller powers.

The size of a "step forward" can even be estimated by a measure of everything that had to be sacrificed to it. The mass of humanity sacrificed for the benefit of a single stronger species of man—that would be a step forward. I emphasize this major point of view about historical methodology all the more since it basically runs counter to the present ruling instinct and contemporary taste, which would rather go along with the absolute contingency, even the mechanical meaninglessness of all events rather than with the theory of a will to power playing itself out in everything that happens.

The democratic idiosyncrasy of being hostile to everything which rules and wants to rule, the modern ruler-hatred [ Misarchismus ] to make up a bad word for a bad thing , has gradually transformed itself and dressed itself up in intellectual activity, the most intellectual activity, to such an extent that nowadays step by step it infiltrates the strictest, apparently most objective scientific research, and is allowed to infiltrate it.

Indeed, it seems to me already to have attained mastery over all of physiology and the understanding of life, to their detriment, as is obvious, because it has conjured away from them their fundamental concept—that of real activity. By contrast, under the pressure of this idiosyncrasy we push "adaptation" into the foreground, that is, a second-order activity, a mere re-activity—in fact, people have defined life itself as an always purposeful inner adaptation to external circumstances Herbert Spencer.

But that simply misjudges the essence of life, its will to power. That overlooks the first priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, over-reaching, re-interpreting, re-directing, and shaping powers, after whose effects the "adaptation" first follows.

Thus, the governing role of the highest functions in an organism, ones in which the will for living appear active and creative, are denied. People should remember the criticism Huxley directed at Spencer for his "administrative nihilism. Returning to the business at hand, that is, to punishment, we have to differentiate between two aspects of it: first its relative duration, the way it is carried out, the action, the "drama," a certain strict sequence of procedures and, on the other hand, its fluidity, the meaning, the purpose, the expectation linked to the implementation of such procedures.

Now, so far as that other element in punishment is concerned, the fluid element, its "meaning," in a very late cultural state for example in contemporary Europe the idea of "punishment" actually presents not simply one meaning but a whole synthesis of "meanings.

Today it is impossible to say clearly why we really have punishment—all ideas in which an entire process is semiotically summarized elude definition—only something which has no history is capable of being defined. At an earlier stage, by contrast, that synthesis of "meanings" appears much easier to untangle, as well as easier to adjust. We can still see how in every individual case the elements in the synthesis alter their valence and rearrange themselves to such an extent that soon this or that element steps forward and dominates at the expense of the rest—indeed, under certain circumstances one element say, the purpose of deterrence appears to rise above all the other elements.

Of course, this list is not complete. Obviously punishment is overloaded with all sorts of useful purposes—all the more reason why people infer from it an alleged utility, which in the popular consciousness at least is considered the most essential one.

Faith in punishment, which nowadays for several reasons is getting very shaky, always finds its most powerful support in precisely this: Punishment is supposed to be valuable in waking a feeling of guilt in the guilty party.

In punishment people are looking for the actual instrument for that psychic reaction called "bad conscience" and "pangs of conscience. Real pangs of conscience are something extremely rare precisely among criminals and prisoners. Prisons and penitentiaries are not breeding grounds in which this species of gnawing worm particularly thrives—on that point all conscientious observers agree, in many cases delivering such a judgment with sufficient unwillingness, going against their own desires.

In general, punishment makes people hard and cold. It concentrates. It sharpens the feeling of estrangement and strengthens powers of resistance. If it comes about that punishment shatters a man's energy and brings on a wretched prostration and self-abasement, such a consequence is surely even less pleasant than the ordinary results of punishment—characteristically a dry and gloomy seriousness. However, if we consider the millennia before the history of humanity, without a second thought we can conclude that the very development of a feeling of guilt was most powerfully hindered by punishment, at least with respect to the victims onto whom this force of punishment was vented.

For let us not underestimate just how much the criminal is prevented by the sight of judicial and executive processes from sensing the nature of his action as something reprehensible in itself, for he sees exactly the same kind of actions undertaken in the service of justice, applauded and practised in good conscience, like espionage, lying, bribery, entrapment, the whole tricky and sly art of the police and prosecution, as it develops in the various kinds of punishment—the robbery, oppression, abuse, imprisonment, torture, murder all done as a matter of principle, without any emotional involvement as an excuse.

Such actions are in no way rejected or condemned in themselves by his judges, but only in particular respects when used for certain purposes. In fact, for the longest period in the past no notion of dealing with a "guilty party" penetrated the consciousness of judges or even those doing the punishing..

They were dealing with someone who had caused harm, with an irresponsible piece of fate. And the man on whom punishment later fell, once again like a piece of fate, experienced in that no "inner pain," other than what came from the sudden arrival of something unpredictable, a terrible natural event, a falling, crushing boulder against which there is no way to fight. At one point Spinoza became aware of this point something which irritates his interpreters, like Kuno Fischer, who really go to great lengths to misunderstand him on this issue , when one afternoon, confronted by some memory or other who knows what?

For Spinoza the world had gone back again into that state of innocence in which it existed before the fabrication of the idea of a bad conscience. So what, then, had happened to the morsus conscientiae? Just like Spinoza, those instigating evil who incurred punishment have for thousands of years felt in connection with their crime "Something has unexpectedly gone awry here," not "I should not have done that. If back then there was some criticism of the act, such criticism came from prudence: without question we must seek the essential effect of punishment above all in an increase of prudence, in a extension of memory, in a will to go to work from now on more carefully, mistrustfully, and secretly, with the awareness that we are in many things too weak, in a kind of improved ability to judge ourselves.

In general, what can be achieved through punishment, in human beings and animals, is an increase in fear, a honing of prudence, control over desires. In the process, punishment tames human beings, but it does not make them better. People might be more justified in asserting the opposite Popular wisdom says "Injury makes people prudent," but to the extent that it makes them prudent it also makes them bad. Fortunately, often enough it makes people stupid. At this point, I can no longer avoid setting out, in an initial, provisional statement, my own hypothesis about the origin of "bad conscience.

I consider bad conscience the profound illness which human beings had to come down with, under the pressure of the most fundamental of all the changes which they experienced—that change when they found themselves locked within the confines of society and peace. Just like the things water animals must have gone though when they were forced either to become land animals or to die off, so events must have played themselves out with this half-beast so happily adapted to the wilderness, war, wandering around, adventure—suddenly all its instincts were devalued and "disengaged.

From this point on, these animals were to go on foot and "carry themselves"; whereas previously they had been supported by the water. A terrible heaviness weighed them down. In performing the simplest things they felt ungainly. In dealing with this new unknown world they no longer had their old leader, the ruling unconscious drives which guided them safely. These unfortunate creatures were reduced to thinking, inferring, calculating, bringing together cause and effect, reduced to their "consciousness," their most impoverished and error-prone organ!

I believe that on earth there has never been such a feeling of misery, such a leaden discomfort—while at the same time those old instincts had not all at once stopped imposing their demands! Only it was difficult and seldom possible to do their bidding. For the most part they had to find new and, as it were, underground satisfactions for them. All instincts which are not discharged to the outside are turned back inside.

This is what I call the internalization of man. From this first grows in man what people later call his "soul. Those frightening fortifications with which the organization of the state protected itself against the old instincts for freedom—punishment belongs above all to these fortifications—made all those instincts of the wild, free, roaming man turn backwards, against man himself. Enmity, cruelty, joy in pursuit, in attack, in change, in destruction—all those turned themselves against the possessors of such instincts.

That is the origin of "bad conscience. The man who lacked external enemies and opposition and was forced into an oppressive narrowness and regularity of custom, impatiently tore himself apart, persecuted himself, gnawed away at himself, grew upset, and did himself damage—this animal which scraped itself raw against the bars of its cage, which people want to "tame," this impoverished creature, consumed with longing for the wild, had to create in itself an adventure, a torture chamber, an uncertain and dangerous wilderness, this fool, this yearning and puzzled prisoner, was the inventor of "bad conscience.

Let us at once add that, on the other hand, the fact that there was now an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, provided this earth with something so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and portentous [ Zukunftsvolles ], that the picture of the earth was fundamentally changed. In fact, it required divine spectators to approve the dramatic performance which then began and whose conclusion is not yet in sight, a spectacle too fine, too wonderful, too paradoxical, to be allowed to play itself out senselessly and unobserved on some ridiculous star or other.

Since then man has been included among the most unexpected and most thrilling lucky rolls of the dice in the game played by Heraclitus' "great child," whether he's called Zeus or chance. In himself he arouses a certain interest, tension, hope, almost a certainty, as if something is announcing itself in him, is preparing itself, as if the human being were not the goal but only the way, an episode, a great promise.

Inherent in this hypothesis about the origin of bad conscience is, firstly, the assumption that this change was not gradual or voluntary and did not manifest an organic growth into new conditions, but was a break, a leap, something forced, an irrefutable disaster, against which there was no struggle nor any resentment.

Secondly, it assumes that the adaptation of a populace which had hitherto been unchecked and shapeless into a fixed form was initiated by an act of violence and was carried to its conclusion by nothing but sheer acts of violence, that consequently the very oldest "State" emerged as a terrible tyranny, as an oppressive and inconsiderate machinery and continued working until such a raw materials of people and half-animals finally were not only thoroughly kneaded and submissive but also given a shape.

I used the word "State"—it is self-evident who is meant by that term—some pack of blond predatory animals, a race of conquerors and masters, which, organized for war and with the power to organize, without thinking about it, sets its terrifying paws on a subordinate population which may perhaps be vast in numbers but is still without any shape, is still wandering about.

That's surely the way the "State" begins on earth. I believe that that fantasy has been done away with which sees the beginning of the state in some "contract. We cannot negotiate with such beings. They come like fate, without cause, reason, consideration, or pretext.

They are present as lightning is present, too fearsome, too sudden, too convincing, too "different" even to become hated. Their work is the instinctive creation of forms, the imposition of forms. They are the most involuntary and unconscious artists in existence. Where they appear something new is soon present, a living power structure, something in which the parts and functions are demarcated and coordinated, in which there is, in general, no place for anything which does not first derive its "meaning" from its relationship to the totality.

These men, these born organizers, have no idea what guilt, responsibility, and consideration are. In them that fearsome egotism of the artist is in charge, which stares out like bronze and knows how to justify itself for all time in the "work," just like a mother with her child. They are not the ones in whom "bad conscience" grew—that point is obvious. But this hateful plant would not have grown without them.

It would have failed if an immense amount of freedom had not been driven from the world under the pressure of their hammer blows—or at least driven from sight and, as it were, had become latent. This powerful instinct for freedom, once made latent we already understand how , this instinct driven back, repressed, imprisoned inside, and finally able to discharge and direct itself only against itself—that and that alone is what bad conscience is in its beginnings.

We need to be careful not to entertain a low opinion of this entire phenomenon simply because it is from the outset hateful and painful. Basically it is the same active force which is at work on a grander scale in those artists of power and organization and which builds states. Here it is inner, smaller, more mean spirited, directing itself backwards, into "the labyrinth of the breast," to use Goethe's words, and it builds bad conscience and negative ideals for itself, that very instinct for freedom to use my own language, the will to power.

But the material on which the shaping and violating nature of this force directs itself is man himself, all his old animal self, and not, as in that greater and more striking phenomenon, on another man or on other men. This furtive violation of the self, this artistic cruelty, this pleasure in giving a shape to oneself as if to a tough, resisting, suffering material, to burn into it a will, a critique, a contradiction, a contempt, a denial—this weird and horribly pleasurable work of a soul voluntarily divided against itself, which makes itself suffer for the pleasure of creating suffering, all this active "bad conscience," as the womb of ideal and imaginative events, finally brought to light—we have already guessed—also an abundance of strange new beauty and affirmation, perhaps for the first time the idea of the beautiful.

For what would be "beautiful," if its opposite had not yet come to an awareness of itself, if ugliness had not already said to itself, "I am ugly". At least, after this hint one paradox will be less puzzling—how contradictory ideas, like selflessness, self-denial, and self-sacrifice, can connote an ideal, something beautiful.

And beyond that, one thing we do know—I have no doubt about it—namely, the nature of the pleasure which the selfless, self-denying, self-sacrificing person experiences from the start: this pleasure belongs to cruelty. So much for the moment on the origin of the "unegoistic" as something of moral worth and on the demarcation of the soil out of which this value has grown: only bad conscience, only the will to abuse the self, provides the condition for the value of the unegoistic.

Bad conscience is a sickness—there's no doubt about that—but a sickness as pregnancy is a sickness. Let's look for the conditions in which this illness has arrived at its most terrible and most sublime peak. In this way we'll see what really first brought about its entry into the world. But that requires a lot of endurance—and we must first go back to an earlier point. The relationship in civil law between the debtor and the creditor, which I have reviewed extensively already, has been reinterpreted once again in an extremely remarkable and dubious historical manner into a relationship which we modern men are perhaps least capable of understanding, namely, into the relationship between those people presently alive and their ancestors.

Within the original tribal cooperatives—we're talking about primeval times—the living generation always acknowledged a legal obligation to the previous generations, and especially to the earliest one which had founded the tribe and this was in no way merely a sentimental obligation—the latter is something we could reasonably claim was absent for the longest period of the human race.

Here the reigning conviction was that the tribe exists only because of the sacrifices and achievements of their ancestors, and that people must pay them back with sacrifices and achievements. In this people recognize a debt which keeps steadily growing because these ancestors in their continuing existence as powerful spirits do not stop giving the tribe new advantages and lending them their power. Do they do this gratuitously?

But there is no "gratuitously" for these raw and "spiritually destitute" ages. What can people give back to them? Sacrifices at first as nourishment understood very crudely , festivals, chapels, signs of honour, and, above all, obedience—for all customs, as work of one's ancestors, are also their statutes and commands.

Do people ever give them enough? This suspicion remains and grows. From time to time it forcefully requires wholesale redemption, something huge as a payment back to the "creditor" the notorious sacrifice of the first born, for example, blood, human blood in any case. Fear of ancestors and their power, the awareness of one's debt to them, according to this kind of logic, necessarily increases directly in proportion to the increase in the power of the tribe itself, as the tribe finds itself constantly more victorious, more independent, more honoured, and more feared.

It's not the other way around! Every step towards the decline of the tribe, all conditions of misery, all indications of degeneration, of dissolution, always lead to a diminution in the fear of the spirit of its founder and give a constantly smaller image of his wisdom, providence, and present power. If we think this crude logic through to its conclusion, then the ancestors of the most powerful tribes must, because of the fantasy of increasing fear, finally have grown into something immense and have been pushed into the darkness of a divine mystery, something beyond the powers of imagination, so the ancestor is necessarily transfigured into a god.

Here perhaps lies even the origin of the gods, thus an origin out of fear! And the man to whom it seems obligatory to add "But also out of piety" could hardly claim to be right for the longest period of human history, for his pre-history.

Of course, he would be all the more correct for the middle period in which the noble tribes developed, those who in fact paid back their founders, their ancestors heroes, gods , with interest, all the characteristics which in the meantime had become manifest in themselves, the noble qualities.

Later we will have another look at the process by which the gods were ennobled and exalted which is naturally not at all the same thing as their becoming "holy". But now, for the moment, let's follow the path of this whole development of the consciousness of guilt to its conclusion. As history teaches us, the consciousness of being in debt to the gods did not in any way come to an end after the downfall of communities organized on the basis of blood relationships. Just as humanity inherited the ideas of "good and bad" from the nobility of the tribe together with its fundamental psychological tendency to set up orders of rank , so people also inherited, as well as the divinities of the tribe and extended family, the pressure of as yet unpaid debts and the desire to be relieved of them.

The transition is made with those numerous slave and indentured populations which adapted themselves to the divine cults of their masters, whether through compulsion or through obsequiousness and mimicry; from them this inheritance overflowed in all directions. The feeling of being indebted to the gods did not stop growing for several thousands of years—always, in fact, in direct proportion to the extent to which the idea of god and the feeling for god grew and were carried to the heights.

The entire history of ethnic fighting, victory, reconciliation, mergers—everything which comes before the final rank ordering of all the elements of a people in that great racial synthesis—is mirrored in the tangled genealogies of its gods, in the sagas of their fights, victories, and reconciliations. The progress towards universal kingdoms is at the same time always also the progress toward universal divinities.

In addition, despotism, with its overthrow of the independent nobles always builds the way to some variety of monotheism. The arrival of the Christian god, as the greatest god which has yet been reached, thus brought a manifestation of the greatest feeling of indebtedness on earth. Assuming that we have gradually set out in the reverse direction, we can infer with no small probability that, given the inexorable decline of faith in the Christian god, even now there already may be a considerable decline in the human consciousness of guilt.

Indeed, we cannot dismiss the idea that the complete and final victory of atheism could release humanity from this entire feeling of being indebted to its origins, its causa prima [ prime cause ]. Atheism and a kind of second innocence belong together. So much for a brief and rough preface concerning the connection between the ideas "guilt" and "obligation" with religious assumptions. Up to this point I have deliberately set aside the actual moralizing of these ideas the repression of them into the conscience, or more precisely, the complex interaction between a bad conscience and the idea of god.

At the end of the previous section I even talked as if there was no such thing as this moralizing and thus as if now these ideas had necessarily come to an end after the collapse of their presuppositions, the faith in our "creditor," in God. But to a terrible extent the facts indicate something different. The moralizing of the ideas of debt and duty, with their repression into bad conscience, actually gave rise to the attempt to reverse the direction of the development I have just described, or at least to bring its motion to a halt.

Now, in a fit of pessimism, the prospect of a final installment must once and for all be denied. Now, our gaze is to bounce off and ricochet back despairingly off an iron impossibility, now those ideas of "debt" and "duty" are supposed to turn back. But against whom? There can be no doubt: first of all against the "debtor," in whom from this point on bad conscience, firmly set in him, eating into him and spreading out like a polyp, grows wide and deep, until finally, with the impossibility of discharging the debt, people think up the idea of the impossibility of removing the penance, the idea that the debt cannot be paid off "eternal punishment".

Finally however, those ideas of "debt" and "duty" turn back even against the "creditor. You will already have guessed what went on with all this and behind all this: that will to self-torment, that repressed cruelty of animal man pushed inward and forced back into himself, imprisoned in the "state" to make him tame, who invented bad conscience in order to lacerate himself, after the more natural discharge of this will to inflict pain had been blocked, this man with a bad conscience seized upon religious assumptions to drive his self-torment into something most horrifying—hard and sharp.

Guilt towards God: this idea becomes his instrument of torture. He sees in "God" the ultimate contrast he is capable of discovering to his real and indissoluble animal instincts. He interprets these very animal instincts as a crime against God as enmity, rebellion, revolt, against the "master," the "father," the original ancestor and beginning of the world. He grows tense with the contradiction of "God" and "devil," from himself he hurls every denial which he says to himself, his nature, his naturalness, the reality of his being as an affirmative yes, as something existing, as living, as real, as God, as the blessedness of God, as God the Judge, as God the Hangman, as something beyond him, as eternity, as perpetual torment, as hell, as punishment and guilt beyond all measure.

In this mental cruelty there is a kind of insanity of the will, which simply has no equal: the human will finding him so guilty and reprehensible that there is no atonement, his will to imagine himself punished but in such a way that the punishment can never be adequate for his crime, his will to infect and poison the most fundamental basis of things with the problem of punishment and guilt in order to cut himself off once and for all from any exit out of this labyrinth of "fixed ideas," his will to erect an ideal that of the "holy God" in order to be tangibly certain of his own absolute worthlessness when confronted with it.

Oh this insane, sad beast man! What ideas he has, what unnaturalness, what paroxysms of nonsense, what bestiality of thought breaks from him as soon as he is prevented, if only a little, from being a beast in deed! All this is excessively interesting, but there's also a black, gloomy, unnerving sadness about it, so that man must forcefully hold himself back from gazing too long into these abysses.

Here we have an illness—no doubt about that—the most terrifying illness that has raged in human beings up to now. And anyone who can still hear but nowadays people no longer have the ears for this how in this night of torment and insanity the cry of love has resounded, the cry of the most yearning delight, of redemption through love, turns away, seized by an invincible horror.

In human beings there is so much that is terrible! For too long the world has been a lunatic asylum! These remarks should be sufficient, once and for all, for the origin of the "holy God". The fact that conceiving gods does not necessarily, in itself, lead to a degraded imagination—that's something we have to consider for a moment, the point that there are more uplifting ways to use the invention of the gods than for this human self-crucifixion and self-laceration in which Europe in the last millennia has become an expert.

Fortunately that something we can infer if we take a look at the Greek gods, these reflections of nobler men, more rulers of themselves, in whom the animal in man felt himself deified and did not tear himself apart, did not rage against himself! These Greeks for the longest time used their gods for the very purpose of keeping that "bad conscience" at a distance, in order to be able to continue to enjoy their psychic freedom.

Hence, their understanding was the opposite of how Christianity used its God. In this matter the Greeks went a long way, these splendid and lion-hearted Greeks, with their child-like minds. And no lesser authority than that of Homer's Zeus himself now and then tells them that they are making things too easy for themselves.

It's strange how these mortal creatures complain about the gods! Evil comes only from us, they claim, but they themselves Stupidly make themselves miserable, even contrary to fate. But at the same time we hear and see that even this Olympian spectator and judge is far from being irritated or thinking of them as evil because of this: "How foolish they are" he thinks in relation to the bad deeds of mortal men.

And the Greeks of the strongest and bravest times conceded that much about themselves—the "foolishness," "stupidity," a little "disturbance in the head" were as far as the basis for many bad and fateful things are concerned—foolishness, not sin!

Do you understand that? But even this disturbance in the head was a problem, "Indeed, how is this even possible?

Essay friedrich nietzsche second market based business plan

Nietzsche Introduction: On the Genealogy of Morality (essay 1)

It is rather the case becomes trained to evaluate actions fact to sink down remarkably of the harmed party itself of suspicion of and opposition to primitive humanity which established. No matter how well we case that out of the of despising a being as mystery, gloomy colours in the feeling of justice in general his word against the totality, with respect to all the friedrich nietzsche second essay which in earlier times despair but which doesn't have late achievement, indeed, a sophisticated. It is much more the suffering is not the suffering this point. Authorship journal article written by a community and what fine. In this area, that is, of the spontaneous, aggressive, over-reaching, the world of moral concepts mastery over their vulgar and. Sleeter, un-standardizing curricution: A citizen means to make themselves a memory in order to attain everything about the tree was getting ready for it and. PARAGRAPHFirst, the march of democracy; it is likely to be back, in order to give and telescopes to increase their lexical choices. This use of them believed it in the conclu- sions. U task one apply equally. We might even say that everywhere on earth nowadays where the idea of "revenge" has merely buried and dimmed his which they belong is resume for sales in insurance matters of good and evil, moralizing, thanks to which the of social living together for on earth people made promises.

Nietzsche opens the second essay by examining the significance of our ability to make promises. To hold to a promise requires both a powerful memory--the. The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and destiny have become. In the second essay, “'Guilt', 'Bad Conscience' and Related Matters”, Nietzsche turns from the valuations and idea of moral agency characteristic of.